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Abstract. We describe ,t decision procedure for what we call direct predicate calculus. This fragment 
of predicate logic coincides with those formulas that can be proved iu the Gentzen sequent calculus 
with the rule of contraction eliminated. It arose by thinking about what kinds of inferences should 
be considered ‘obvious’ and in that sense characterizes fragments of logic by the tools available 
for proving rest&s ruther than by syntactic properties of formulas. 
M:my computer programs use some form of mechanised reasoning represented 
either explicitly or implicitly in predicate logic- historically theorem proving has 
been a very important parG of Artificial Intelligence. Partial decision procedures for 
predicate logic form many of the tools used in formal reasoning. For example, 
type-checking algorithms for programming languages can be viewed as mechanisa- 
rions of fragments of monadic predicate logic. Universal proof methods like resol- 
ution and natural deduction form the other end of the spectrum. Due to their broad 
applicability, one can expect them to be relatively inefficient in many special cases. 
Design of fast algorithms for suitable subdomains of predicate logic may have 
important consequences for many parts of computer science. Our intent is to present 
a decidable fragment of predicate logic that encompasses some of the simpler modes 
of reasoning in mathematics. 
First-order predicate logic has been traditionally viewed as the place to formalize 
the mathematician’s notion of a ‘tautologous inference’: intuitively it is clear that 
any trivial deduction should be easily formaltLable and decidable In predicate logic. 
No implementation of a decision procedure can settle all problems formaliLi&le 
iii first-order logic. It is therefore important to have a clear abstract description of 
the kind of problem a specific algorithm can solve. The restrictions to be placed 
must not appear arbitrary from the point of view of the user who has no intelrest 
in the details of a particular implementation. 
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Many procedures describe the class of decidable formulas in terms of their syntax. 
For the most trivial case, namely propositional logic, several sufficiently fast 
algorithms are known. For example, the FOL system at the Stanford Artificial 
Intelligence Laboratory has an extreme11 efficient procedure developed by Chandra 
and Weyhrauch for checking propositional tautologies by compiling an optimized 
machine-language program and then executing it. 
The situation gets more complicated with fragments that employ quantifiers in a 
non-trivial way. For example, Lewis [S] has shown that any decision procedure for 
monadic predicate logic (given the present state of opinion on the P = NP problem) 
will run in essentially double exponential time. Another alternative is to consider 
various subclasses of fcrmuias determined by quantifier prefixes. However, we expect 
such trivial syntactic criteria as the number of quantifiers in a formula to appeal 
only to the most technically oriented logician. 
Our approach arose from attempts to describe ‘obvious’ inferences. In other 
words, our purpose is to phrase restrictions in terms of the rules of deduction rather 
than syntax. We do not believe that the n&on of obviousness can be captured by 
elementary syntactic measurements. For example, the formula 
though simple and short, does not seem obvious to us. Closer inspection reveals 
that any proof of this fact involves ‘indirect’ maneuvers. 
We have christened the system we have chosen to work with Direct Predicate 
Calculus. Technically it coincides with the Gentzen sequent calculus with the rule 
of contraction eliminated. This forces the logical complexity of the sequent to 
increase during the course of a proof. We see a rough correspondence with some 
of the properties of context-free languages. 
Another approach to obviousness can be found in [3]. The paper of Andrews [I] 
on matings is closely related. In our particular case we can, however, give a static 
solution to the combinatorial problems encountered during the process of mating 
!see our Theorem 4.4). 
This paper will only consider the theoretical aspects of direct predicate calculus. 
We intend to publish a description of the implementl~tion of our algorithm litter. 
2. ‘Terminology and notat ion 
Our basic language is that of pure first-order predicate logic. We are given a 
structure Y’(, consisting of an infinite list of variable symbols .Y, J*, z, . . . , 8 list P, 
(i- 1,2,... ) of predicate symbols of arity tl , 2 1, and a list of function symbols j; 
(i= 1,2,.. .) of arity m, -2 1. The notion of a term and a formula in the language Y,, 
is then delirled in the usual manner. 
Definition 2.1. Any vrlriable is ;t term. If t,, I, . . . , t,, is a list of terms and j‘ is r-In 
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n-ary function symbol, thenf( t,, t2, . . . , tn) is a term. If l,, fZ, . . . , t, is a !ist of terms 
and P is an n-ary predicate symbol, then P( I,, t,, . . . , t,) is an atomic formula. If 
x is a variable and 4, ~5 are formulas, then so are 
one CE? xix’ go on and formulate a system of predicate logic in the usual fashion. 
Our interest lies in analyzing the notion of provability in this context. For this 
reason, we need to often distinguish between a term and its occurrence in a proof. 
For example, the two occurrences of 9 formula “A” in “A A (A 1 C) 3 D” might 
arise in different ways in a proof. We wish to make this explicit by constructing 
another language 3’ which will allow us to denote any term of Y’~, in infinitely many 
ditferent ways. Y is con:;tructed by assigning to each symbol s of Y,, a countable 
list of distinct symbols O!, O%, . . . of the same arity and type. 
We will further extend the expressive power of 2 by allowing sequem as formulas: 
Given two sequences II II of formulas, r+ 17 is again a formula. 
In general, we use the letters A, B, C, . . . to denote formulas of L? and 1: Jr, 2, . . 
for finite ct JL*quti:,Aces of formulas. Comma will be used as a concatenation operator 
for sequences. The symboU “Y)” denotes tk empty sequence. For any formula A we 
use the notation A[x,/ I,, . . . , s,,/ t,,] for A with all the free occurrences of the variable 
A-, replaced by t, for i = 1, 2, . . . . 
It follows from our definition of a formula for 2 that we can have sequents 
embedded within formulas. Should someone find this offensive, they can easily 
enough replace all sequents within sequents by the appropriate implications. For 
example, we regard A =I B as another way of writing A -+ B. From our point of view, 
this is nothing but a notational convention. 
Define a partial mapping rr from the terms and formulas of 2’ onto the terms 
and formulas of Y,, by setting 
for all symbols and extending this by a straightforward induction to all objects of 
Y‘ not involving sequents. Clearly, the set of pre-images of any term or ;i formula 
of Y,, under 7~ is infinite. 
Two terms t, II of Y’ are called sin~ilur if n( 1) = n(u). 
A term t of Y’ is sqmrnfed if any two Fimilar occurrences of subterms in t are 
distinct elements o!‘ Lf: 
For any f in .Y there is a separated u similar to it. Using this representation one 
can uniquely identify a term (or a formula) thru its position in the proof of some 
other term or its appearance in some other term. This fact will make our arguments 
somewhat easier to formulate. 
Define a partial order < on the set of all terms and formulas of .Y as follows: 
t < 21 Q t occurs in 24. 
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Definition 2.2. A formula A occurs positively in A. If B 
1 C, CID, D/\E, Dv E, V.x.0, SE, 
is one of 
C,,CZ, ..+D,,D? ,..., 
then A occurs positively (negatively) in B if and only if A occurs negatively 
(positively) in one of C, C,, . . . or A occurs positively (nega&ely) in one of 
E, D, D, D,, . . . . 
3. Direct predicate calculus 
The logic of our system is formulated in terms similar to Gentzen’s sequent 
ca1culus, with the exception that we allow embedded sequents. 
Axioms. The set of axioms consists of statements of the form A + B, where A and 
H are similar atomic formulas. 
Structural rules. We have thinning: 
Note that the rule of contraction has been eliminated. 
Logical rules. Our logical rules arc sitnilar to the standard set with the exception 
of -+-introduction replacing the less general rules for implication. In general, these 
rules constitute introductions of a logical symbol: For each symbol we have a rule 
of introduction into the left (antecedent) and into the right (succedent) side of a 
sequent. 
1.4 A, II A, I’+ 11 ----___ _ -__-_ -_--_- 
1.4, I‘-+ BI 1’ -+ 74, II‘ 
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A(t), r+ n I-+ A(v), II 
Vx.A(x), I‘-* l7 T-*Vv.A(v), l7’ 
A(v), l-+ l7 r-, A(t), n 
3v.A(v), r-, n r + 3x.A(x), n’ 
with the obvious restrictions for the last four rules. 
A proof is a sequence of applications of these rules. The result of an application 
of a rule to a sequent is the sequent below the bar of the rule. 
We shall call a formula a of -sP, provable if @I-, A is provable using the rules above 
for some A of 2’ such that n(A) = a. 
Our system differs from the traditional ones mainly by the absence of the cut rule 
and contraction: 
A, B, l-45 r-A, BJ 
-A,r4 l--+A,2 ’ 
where A, P -zu-e similar formulas. 
The cut rule will be proved in the current context. The absence of contraction is 
crucial. This guarantees that every formula can be ‘used’ at most once. It is also 
clear that the complexity r)f a sequent must increase in the course of a proof. Thus 
our system is trivially consistent: One cannot prove the empty sequent c/)+4. In 
general, one can in a systematic way search for a proof of any formula. 
Example 3.1. 3_~V.r.( A(y) 1 A(x)) is not provable. 
Example 3.2. V.x.((Vy.A(y)) 3 A(x)) is provable. 
Example 3.3. 3y.V.x.( A(y) 2 A(s)) v 3y.V.x( A(y) 23 A(x)) is provable. 
Example 3.4. A 3 A A (B v 1 B) i$ provable. 
Example 3.5. A 2 ((A A B) v (A A 33)) is not provable. 
All of the statements given above are easy to verify. In general, the simplest 
possible proof search procedure would be obtAined if ail of our deduction rules 
were reversible: The sequent below the bar is vAid if and only if all of the sequents 
above are valid. %deed, Ketonen [43 has shown that the rules for the propositional 
part of the Gentzen calculus can be stated in such a way. The induced algorithm 
has become known as the Wang [6] algorithm. 
In our case all propositional rules having exactly one assumption are reversible. 
The situation for quantifier rules is similar. Rules requiring more than one assumption 
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are not, in general, reversible: The order of application does matter. This is not a 
cause of regret since it is precisely at this juncture that the Wang algorithm produces 
a great deal of unnecessary duplication of et-Fort. 
The decision procedure for our system consists of bringing a formula into a 
normal form (in linear time) and then applying a theorem characterizing valid 
sequents in this form. 
Lemma 3.6. For my two similar_formulas A, B: A + B is oalid. 
Lemma 3.7. Arz_v proof‘ of’ I’-+ 11 *from the sequents I’, + 11,, . . . , I;, + Ii,, can be uni- 
jbmly transfbrmed into a prooj’ojX2, IT+ 2, ll_from (0, I’, + L, ll,), 1; + IL, . . . , I;, + 
1 I,,. - - 
A fwmula is called inert in a proof if it i:* not a result of an application of a 
pgroof rule or a part of such a formula. 
Lemma 3.9. All propositional rules inoale,irtg only orw ussumption arcs re~~ersihle. 
I‘ ,, 2‘+ a,, I1 .-...--y -_ 
I‘, -9 I>,, (I--, 11) --__. ._-___._ __“____ __. 
. . . 
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Lemma 3.12 (Cut Rule). [/‘A, B are similar, and I‘ + Il. A, and B, 2’ + 0 areprovable, 
then so is r, 2 + II, f2. 
Proof. We may assume that neither A nor B are inert in the proofs of I’+ II, A, 
B, X --) 0, respectively. We proceed by induction on A. 
If A and B are atomic, we induct on the proof of I‘+ II, A, moving the cut ‘higher 
up’ in the proof. 
If A is, for example, a conjunction of the form A, A A2 A l l l A A,,, we must have 
deduced Il.-r 7, A from sequents of the form (I‘, + II,, A,), . . . , (I-‘,, -+ II,, A,,). By 
Lemma 3.9, B,, . . . , B,,, 2 --, 0 is provable, where B = B, A . - - A B,,. We can now 
replace the cut in question by simpler cuts. 
Let us say .4 = B if both A + B and B + A are provable. 
Lemma 3.13. 7714 jUowing _fimnulas are valid : 
-13s.A = Ws. TA, 
-yA A B)- (--1A v IB), 
l(A A B)=(-1A A --@, 
(A ,,..., A,,-4 ,,..., B,,)-=(lA,v.~.v~A,,vB,v.. -v B,,). 
Lemma 3.14. !r’ A = B and I’+ II i.v provable, then so is I“+ 11’ where /I’-+ II’ is 
obtained jiurn 1 ‘+ 11 by rtiplacing an vccurrence similar to A with an occurrence of‘& _ 
Proof. If, for example, A occurs positively in I’ + 77, then the proof of I’--+ 77 must 
have a step in it of the form I -3 /I, A. WC can replace A witn-73 using a cut. 
A variable s in a formula is called universal if it is bound by a universal quantifier 
occurring positively or an existential quantifier occurring negatively. A variable x 
is esistcntial if it is bound by a universal quantifier occurring negatively or an 
existential quantifier occurring positively. 
Lemma 3.15. [f’ A is provable, then so is B, where B is obtained by replacing each 
univer.4 variable u in A by a term of’ the &farm j‘(x,, . . . , _]I,,) and eliminating the 
corresponding quantifier, where j’is a new junction symbol and x,, . . . , x, is the list of 
existential variables in whose scope the binding oj’u occurs. 
Lemma 3.16. Assume that A is a.fhrmula involving no universal quantifiers, and B is 
obtained jkom A by deleting all existential quantijiers and replacing all existential 
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variables by new variables x,, . . . , x,. Then A is provable if and only if 
&l/49 l l * , x,1 t,] is provable for some terms t,, t2, . . . , t,. 
Definition 3.17. A formula A is in normalfbrm if A has the form 
where f, I7 are lists of atomic formulas and C is a list of conjunctions of formulas 
in normal form. 
Putting together Lemmas 3.9-3.16 we obtain the following. 
Lemma 3.18. There is a recursive (linear time) procedure which produces for an) 
-formula A a jbrmula A’ in normal form together with a list qf variables x,, . . . , x, such 
that A is provable if and only iji for some terms t,, t2, . . . , L N-d h, . . . , -hI t,J is 
provable. 
Example 3.19. A normal form for (A 1 B) A (B 1 C) 1 (A 2 C) is 
A-, C,(@+ A)~(B-+fl),(fl+ B)A(C-+. 
4. A decision procedure for validity 
We are now in a position to present a decision procedure for provability in direct 
predicate calculus. By Lemma 3.18 this reduces to the following question. 
Given variables x,, . . . , x,, and a separated sequent C+ I1 in normal form, find 
terms t,, t2, . . . , t,, such that (I’-+ Il)[x,/ t,, . . . , x,,/ t,,] is provable. 
From now on, consider a fixed I-+ If and variables .q, . . . , s,,. 
Definition 4.1. A path 9 for ;\ formula S in normal form is a set of pairs of atomic 
formulas such that: 
(a1 If’ (K P’), (Q, Q’) are two distinct members of 9, then P f (2 and P’ f Q’. 
(b) 9 sati.$es S; in symbols 9 ++ S: There is pair (P, P’) in :rP such that P c S or 
P’c s. 
(c) If :@++A A B, then :/P-A and ;Pt-+ 13. 
(d) if (P, P’) E 9, then P occurs negatively in S rend P’ occurs positively in S. 
Definition 4.2. Two formulas are connected via the path :@: A 11 R, if there is a 
( P, P’) c .-P such that P --; A and P’ -c B or P’ < A and P (: R. 
Definition 4.3. For any path 9, define its in&cc4 ternar_r t’kzfiotl Y? oti the set of 
all conjunctive sub-expressions of II-+ 11 as foliows: 
uo!~mpol~u! JO lu!od ayl MoIaq paw~oj s! (‘! # ! JOJ ‘,y ou )t?!yl q3tlS ‘I! =‘f ! UR YXd 
-‘+‘x II ‘tl 
ieyl y3ns !x jo !Q 
put! woy3npoJlu!-v ue jo l[nsaJ e se palUJOj S! !X qX?g l (h) 
ii’u!Ajs~~es 11 +J jo suo!ssaJdxa-qns aAyun[uoa jo lsg B s! 
pul? ’ ‘x II ‘v 
‘!v syad ar\ey lsntu aiw 
uy palals suoy!puo3 ayl 
(“x ’ l - 
l ‘lx) awnssv 
=qpj (d) snyL wuy!p aq m-u 0 ‘,,I[ + ,,,I pue v ‘,l~+- ,,I aAoqe saymvq aql 
UI pasn sr_uo!x~ ayL -joo.xd Jno u! 3 ‘11 +L[ ruroj aye jo luanbas e ar\oqe 8 ‘,,I[ t ,,.I 
put t/ ‘,LI +-,,I woj ayl JO sluanbas at\eq lsnur am ‘(d) u! se 8 ‘v ‘3 USWJ 
.(h) pue (d) tCJ!~ah 01 suwuaJ 11 . 
Ssuo!lwn[uoD uo uogdurnsse Jno WOJJ s~olioj ylttd e jo uoy!uyap 
ayl jo (3) ued :jooJd ayl u! yled e swoj h uayj_ *joold Jno u! wo!xe UR SB sJn33o 
[UJ /“A- ‘ * - ’ “1 /‘X],d t [“J /“X ‘ ’ * - ‘i~/ix]d ieyi yms (,d ‘d) 11~ jo us ayl aq 4 ial 
‘lu!ofs!p 
alp sjoo.Id aql jo saywwq lu!ofs!p u! %u!JJnDDo surJa)qns jo slas ay, ‘P’dleJedas s! 
u +J awls .alq&io.Id hpt?aJle s! u c x j! “v v . . . v iv ‘u t x urq ay, jo luanbas 
e uyqo 01 uoyIpoJ)u~-v e asn Jahau aM :&xadord ~nuoy!ppe %U!MO]IO~ aq] qJ!M 
luanbas sfql jo jooJd e qa!d -alqeAoJd s! [“~/“~ ‘ l l l ‘9 ,W](,y +,I) atunssv yoo~g 
‘0 II 2 Pue v II x W!M 8 ‘v wed 
aAywn[uoD o~ys!p OM) sey A pue ‘(Jay10 ayi jo uo!ssaldxa-qns es! .myl!au ‘*a*!) 
alqeJedmosu!-> ale 2 ‘A pua x ‘x J! Quo put! J! splay 2 @A g x uoyela~ au 
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If there is a (I?, P’)!E 9 such that P E I7 and P’E f, then by (ar) we are done. 
If there is a conjunction X = A, A l l l A A, belonging to I7 such that no Y in 
r-+ III not d X is co&ected to X, then by (p) the inductive hypothesis is satisfied 
for all sequents 8 + Ai with 9 restricted to Ai. Therefore 0+ Ai[Xl/I,, . . . , x”/ t,] is 
provable for each i. Our claim follows by thinning and A-introduction. 
If neither of the cases mentioned above occur, then each conjunction in f7 must 
be connected to some other expression. 
We claim that there is a conjunction X = A, A l l . A A, in f and 1 s iOs n such 
that, for all i f io, Ai is connected to only atoms occurring on the top level of r+ II. 
If not, we can construct and infinite sequence (Xi) of conjuncts in r with distinct 
parts Ai, Bi such that for all i > 0 
Ai 11 Xi-1 and Bi 11 Xi+,. 
Picking numbers k, I > 0 such that Xk = X,, Aci = A, and Rk = B, would then yiel;l a 
contradiction with (y). 
Let X be a conjunction satisfying the properties stated above. Let Di, fi be the 
lists of atoms on the top level of r-, n connected to Ai for i # i. and II&,, f&, the 
remaining sets of top level expressions, excluding X. By property (a) of paths, these 
lists are disjoint. The inductive hypothesis holds again for all sequents r, + II, Ai, 
with the set C2? appropriately restricted. Our claim follows by A-introduction. 
5. Discussion 
We have shown that the decision problem for our subsystem of predicate calculus 
can be reduced (after a linear-time process for transforming into normal form) into 
a search for a path .cV together with a unifier satisfying properties (a;, (p), (r) of 
Theorem 5.1. This process is exponentially bounded. The actual time required by 
it is determined by the organisation of the search process. 
The search for the path 9 can be severely constrained thru the exploitation of 
only relevant facts as in [2]: In trying to find a path for a formula A, we are interested 
in forming matings in the sense of Andrews [I]; unifiable pairs (P, P’) such that P 
occurs positively and P’ negatively in A. A subformula H is irreleuant if no part of 
B occurs in such a list. If any part of a conjunction is irrelevant, then the whole 
conjunction can be declared irrelevant by property (c) of paths, and all pairs with 
parts in this conjunction can be eliminated froth1 the list of potential matches. The 
elimination of such pairs can then be expected to generate more deletions etc. This 
means that one can accommodate a great deal of irrelevant information without 
blowing up. In practical situations hypotheses and data given to decision procedures 
are often phrased in terms of implications which turn into conjunctions in the 
normalization procedure for formulas. 
Following the methods of Andrews Cl], one can generalize all of the above to 
higher order predicate calculi. This would be one way of introducing equalities into 
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our system, though their treatment would still have to be specially optimized given 
the undecidability of high-order unification. 
In a sense, we can view our approach as an analysis of duplication of formulas 
in Herbrand’s theorem, which reduces the validity of a formula to the validity a 
disjunction of substitution instances of the formula in question. 
Consider the congruence = on the class of all sequents generated by the rules 
P”P”P9 P”PAP9 P = Pv P* 
We can state a semi-decision procedure for predicate logic using the following fact. 
Theorem 5.1. A formula A is provable in predicate calculus if and only if there is a 
,formula congruent to it that is provable in direct predicate calculus. 
Proof. By induction on the proof of the sequent r+ II one can construct a sequent 
congruent o I‘ + 11 and a proof of it not involving contractions. 
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